

VZCZCXRO8778  
PP RUEHDBU  
DE RUEHDBU #2227 3531257  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
P 191257Z DEC 06  
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9250  
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE  
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0767

C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 002227

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN, S/CT (FRED VOGEL) AND CA (ALCY  
FRELICK)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2016

TAGS: [PTER](#) [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [PINR](#) [CVIS](#) [ASEC](#) [KHLS](#) [KVPR](#)

SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN NOT YET AN APPROPRIATE TERRORIST-RELATED DATA  
SHARING PARTNER

REF: 06 STATE 190832

CLASSIFIED BY: Tracey Jacobson, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy  
Dushanbe, STATE.  
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (SBU) Post is engaged in informal information sharing with Tajik Government law enforcement and security service entities. However, the limited biometric and biographic information in Tajik travel documents, as well as their elementary and improperly used immigration and security databases, make the systematic collection of terrorist-related data unreliable (reftel).

¶2. (SBU) Immigration Databases: Despite a recent USG-funded IOM project to supply computers to several main Tajik points of entry (including Dushanbe International Airport), many Tajik border and immigration officials do not use the automated system, sticking to paper logs and longhand databases. Limited training, power brownouts (particularly on the Uzbek and Afghan border), and reluctance to use the new equipment all contribute to partial and improper use of the computer databases that are available. The databases are not connected to each other or to a central server.

¶3. (SBU) Watchlist and Information Sharing: The computer database uses a very general name-based Watchlist, consisting only of information from the immigration department of the Ministry of Interior. Even Tajik officials admit the Watchlist is incomplete and rarely updated. Since the system is seldom used to screen for names, there is no evidence to demonstrate that even a properly documented name hit will be found and matched to a person crossing the border. Though the Ministry of Interior (other than the immigration and registration department) and Ministry of Security keep additional databases, we understand this information is not shared directly with the border authorities as part of a general Watchlist system. Specific lookouts are disseminated by longhand note and word of mouth, or by dispatching special officers to a border point for a specific operation. Tajik authorities cooperate with their neighbors (Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, China, and Kyrgyzstan) on a case-by-case basis but do not routinely share their databases or Watchlists.

¶4. (SBU) Biometrics: The Tajik passport, machine readable but of very poor quality, does not contain additional biometric features. The passport readers currently at place in Dushanbe Airport and at several border posts do not have the ability to machine read Tajik passports - only better quality international machine readable passports.

¶5. (C) Identifying Appropriate Partners: Due to the above

information, Tajikistan would make a very poor data sharing partner. Though the Tajik border authorities want to upgrade their Watchlist capabilities, internal and external systematic data sharing, and passport quality, scant resources prevent this from happening. The OSCE is currently considering a border security assistance project for Tajikistan which might include working with the Tajik Government to improve immigration data collection and sharing.

JACOBSON